Democrats and authoritarians 

11.06.2021

One of many 

The cover of the recent issue of the Polish weekly “Tygodnik Powszechny” with a section dedicated to the update on the current situation in Belarus run a title “Raman Pratasevich. Prisoner number one”. The Polish outlet follows the usual Western approach towards eastern neighbors. Politicians and journalists focus on single cases, avoiding thinking about the structural problems that caused a given situation. 

According to the Belarusian Human Rights Centre Viasna, there are 476 political prisoners in Belarus as of June 9. These are not only people detained during recent protests but also earlier opposition activists. The Anarchist Black Cross Belarus claims that the total number of prisoners detained after the beginning of protests is 420. Only 251 of them are recognised as political prisoners. So we can safely say that now we have around 600 people detained due to political reasons in the Republic of Belarus. 

These people are being beaten, brutally interrogated, raped, kept in inhumane conditions. There are loads of pictures and accounts that confirm these claims. The Belarusian government does not hide the evidence. It only helps to spread fear among Belarusians. 

Belarusian secret police were brutal since the beginning of Alexander Lukashenko’s rule. Some people that opposed the Belarusian president at the beginning of his rule are still missing. Others were jailed or forced out of the country. 

Repressions continued throughout the two-and-a-half-decade rule of Lukashenko. Arbitrary detentions, death threats, removal from universities and workplaces were always a reality for people who struggled for independence in Belarus. Pratasevich is one of many. 

The brotherhood of machines 

As we know, the kidnapping of Pratasevich was a joint Russian-Belarusian effort. Russian security officers were probably following Pratasevich and his partner from Greece. This operation was not an exception in the long-lasting and deep cooperation between the security forces of both countries. 

The kidnapping of Pavel Grib in 2017 was a similar case. Grab, a 19-years old Ukrainian citizen, met a Russian girl, Tatiana, on the internet. After some exchange, they agreed to meet in Belarus, in Homel, where Grib disappeared. He reappeared in Russia, charged with planning a terrorist attack in Sochi. He was then condemned to 6 years but subsequently released during the Russia-Ukraine exchange of prisoners in 2019. 

It is essential to understand that this couldn’t have been done without joint planning, cooperation, and execution of the two organisations. Grab claimed that he was detained by one group of men in Homel, taken from the city, handed over to another group of men and then officially arrested in the Smolensk region, which means all this happened on the Belarusian-Russian borderland. 

As we can see, what happened to Pratasevich was not a novelty in the history of cooperation between Belarusian and Russian political police. Perhaps the scale kidnapping of the aeroplane was a novelty, but not the machine that prepared the action and led to it. 

Poking the West 

But machines only execute orders. Particularly in autocracies. So, what was the goal of these two autocracies? 

We must get back in time, almost six months. 

In January, Joe Biden was sworn as the 46th US president. As usual in the case of change at this post, Moscow began to test the unity of the West. 

Kremlin initiated a media wave with two main messages. Moscow underlined the tensions between Russia and Ukraine are growing again and may lead to conflict. Russian-led propaganda stressed that this is an effect of “irresponsible Kyiv’s actions”. 

At the same time, Kremlin transmitted another message. It reminded Washington that Moscow is an essential partner in strategic armaments. The status of nuclear power is always a card that Kremlin can play to look equal to the US. 

Remember that protests and repressions are ongoing both in Russia and Belarus. Putin and Lukashenko need to reassert their position. The Belarusian president has to suppress the last elements of the opposition against him. Russian president prepares the ground for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

And then, the EU foreign policy high representative Josep Borrell travels to Moscow, claiming that he can influence Russian counterparts. The visit not only proved him wrong. It also allowed Kremlin to show how little it cares about the EU’s opinion. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov openly cliticised the EU during the joint conference with Borrell. On the same day, Moscow had announced that it expelled diplomats from Sweden, Poland, and Germany for purportedly participating in “illegal protests”. 

The plot thickened when Russia started to amass additional forces on the border with Ukraine. This move was again accompanied by a media campaign, suggesting that Russia can invade Belarus to use it as a platform for an offensive against Ukraine. 

In the next move, in April, the Belarusian president announces that Russian and Belarusian security forces detained in Moscow a group of Belarusian opposition activists, led by Jurij Zienkovich, Grigoriy Kostusev and Alexander Feduta. The group was allegedly planning a military coup in Belarus to remove Lukashenka from his post. Russian FSB confirmed the operation, suggesting in its statement that the group was supported and trained by western security forces. 

A few days later, the Russian president gave the speech to the Federal Assembly. He compared the situation in Belarus to the situation in Ukraine. Putin stated if the coup succeeded, the situation in Belarus would follow the Ukrainian path. 

So in April, with the tension on the Russian-Ukrainian borders and repressions against the civil society, both authoritarian politicians were essentially saying to the West - “you don’t have a say in what’s happening in this region”. 

And the West blinked. Washington started the discussion on a dialogue between the US and Russia. Russia eased the tension by withdrawing additional forces from the border with Ukraine. And on May 19, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met  for the first time with his Russian counterpart.
However, the internal political tension in Russia and Belarus continue. There is still some resistance in Belarus. The elections in Russia are yet to come. And the meeting between the Russian and US president is only planned for June 16. 

In constant need to pressure the West Moscow and Minsk organize yet another joint operation. They kidnap an European plane flying between two EU countries. The plane carrying an Belarusian oppositionist. Belarus and Russia are again reminding the West - “here we can do what we want”. Strengthening a fear of potential protesters in both countries is an additional bonus. 

The new way of the West 

Roman Pratasievich fell victim to Belarusian-Russian power games against the West. His brutal kidnapping shows that Minsk and Moscow are ruthless in these games and work hand-in-hand. 

Moreover, this operation reveals the weakness of the eastern policy of the West. The approach to Belarus and Russia is incidental. Western politicians tend to focus on problems only when they appear. They rarely look at the broader context of the problem and its long-term causes. 

The appropriate reaction to the kidnapping of the Ryanair plane would be to apply a policies, that address the systemic roots of the problem. 

The West needs to stop blinking first. The EU needs to show Russia that it is a partner that should be considered seriously. Not only as a part of the US-led group. 

Brussels and EU Member States should change its policies on few levels if it wants to be effective towards the Belarusian-Russian autocratic duo. The EU needs a genuine strategic autonomy in foreign and security policy. Currently, it is a collection of approaches towards different states, mainly arising from the interests of countries that are already engaged in a given region. 

A strategic approach to foreign policy would help to mitigate Russia’s attempts to play different European capitals against each other. It will also help to organise joint actions forcing authoritarian regimes to change their policies. The real sanctions that would shake the basis of Belarus autocracy would require bringing to the table not only European countries but also Ukraine and the United Kingdom - important importers of oil products. The same goes for the other crucial Belarusian export commodity - potash products sold to India or China. The EU could only organise this coordinated effort with a strategic and long term approach to foreign policy. 

Moreover, Europeans should understand that recent events in Belarus and Russia show the power of their societies. The unprecedented mobilisation of Belarusian society against falsified presidential elections and country-wide protests in Russia against Moscow’s political repressions is explicit confirmation that citizens in both countries cannot be ignored. 

This should result in two changes in the EU’s approach to protests in Russia and Moscow. Firstly, politicians, journalists and opinion leaders should stop focusing on single politicians, journalists, activists or prisoners. The personalisation of protests endangers people who face the protests - Pratasevich being the latest example. It also alienates people that are suffering the same repressions but have no publicity. 

Based on this new approach, European decision-makers should implement new tactics towards protests - and this is the second change needed. They should focus on broad support to all grass-roots organisations, the more decentraliser, the better - independent trade unions, neighbourhoods organisations, ad-hoc self-help structures. This would drastically change the context of the social and political change in Belarus and Russia and strengthen the movement towards democratic change. 

Moreover, the deeper democratisation of support to Belarusian and Russian societies would help to tackle the democracy deficit that haunts the EU. Ex Oriente Lux.