Illusive alliance: troublesome integration of Russia and Belarus 

19.05.2021

Belarus became independent in 1991 but due to historical heritage of close ties with Russia and Russian influence (current Belarusian lands since 18th century were a part of Russian Empire and in 20th century were included into USRR) and linguistic and cultural proximity, majority of Belarusians weren’t interested in the anti-Russian policy. Additional and very important factor, which influenced “pro-Russian” orientation of just independent Belarus, was very difficult economic situation. Developed in period of Soviet Union Belarusian heavy industry (mostly: petrochemical, machinery sectors and metallurgy) wasn’t able to run without cooperation with Russian Federation as the former “centre of USRR”, which was not only exclusive supplier of components for the production but also key market for Belarusian export. Furthermore,  because of lack of own sources of gas and a very small production of oil, Minsk was highly dependent on supplies both energy resources from Russia, what gave to Moscow the powerful instrument of influence on internal situation in Belarus as well as its foreign policy. It should also be remembered that Belarusian elites at the very early stage of independence came in majority from former soviet nomenklatura and they were not able to define sovereign Belarus apart from modern Russia, understood by them as the successor mighty empire, which was once Soviet Union. Therefore, proposed mostly by democratic opposition at the beginning of the 90-s, ideas of regional alliances (without Russia) with other former soviet republics located between Baltic and Black Seas were doomed to failure. 

Alyaksandr Lukashenka as a winner of the first presidential elections in Belarus, hold in 1994, added to the inertial tendency of approaching of Belarus to Russia important ideological content. The first one president of the Republic of Belarus won the elections (so far, there was only on case, when Belarusians could elect their leader in democratic way – just in 1994) mainly thanks to excellent skills at playing with yearning of the majority of society for the soviet past – seen as the “era of stability”. These kind of sentimental feelings at that time were based not only on good memories from the 80-s or 70-s but also on deep disappointment with the first years of independence. Lukashenka, as a man who grown up and has got all education in soviet period, supported idea of the unity of Slavic nations and openly pursued towards integration with Russia. Therefore from the mid of 90-s, in close cooperation with contemporary president of Russia Boris Yeltsin, Lukashenka signed several bilateral agreements, which have been finalized on the 8th of December 1999, when both leaders accepted the treaty on the creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus. Full implementation of this document would mean building of confederation of both states, tied with common legal regulations and common institutions such as central bank. Famous for having enormous political ambitions Lukashenka expected that ill, weak Yeltsin eventually will step down, and the path for the highest political career of the young Belarusian president to the Kremlin will be opened.   

Meanwhile decision made by Yeltsin and his advisors on appointment of Wladimir Putin in 2000 as a new president of Russia definitely ruled out the intentions of Lukashenka. Firm and ambitious former KGB officer was much harder counterpart for negotiations then Yeltisn was. Even first meetings of both president showed very clearly, that they do not trust each other and their contacts are first of all the results of necessity of following of economic and geopolitical factors. Minsk dramatically needed Russian subsidies what means cheap energy resources, discounts for exporters on Russian market and low-interest loans. From the other hand, Moscow could not afford the loss of influence, located on a crucial for Russian geopolitical interests place in the middle of Europe, on the western flank against “enemies” from NATO and EU. At the same time Russian elites expressed high disappointment with limited real cooperation, while in exchange for support (according to IMF only in period of 10 years between 2005-2015 level of subsidies exceeded 100 billions of dollars) Russian authorities were getting mostly general declarations on “eternal friendship and brotherhood”. That’s why, journalist, who watched carefully weakened dynamics of Russian-Belarusian relations, called negotiations between Minsk and Moscow as an “exchange of gas for kisses”. Responsible for deadlock was first of all Lukashenko, who quite quickly understood that Putin strives to integration on Russian conditions, which de facto will lead to gradual limitation of Belarusian sovereignty. Therefore, typical soviet person as Lukashenka was, became under pressure of Kremlin devoted and quite effective defender of independent Belarus.             

As a result of mentioned above circumstances, the integration of Belarus and Russia in a frame of Union State has stopped and relations between Minsk and Moscow came into cycle of convoluted negotiations (often similar to bargaining of two experienced and not honest traders) on volume of current subsidies for Belarusian economy and directions of further cooperation. Contradiction of interests of both sides complicated not only reaching of any important agreement but also created many conflicts or at least misunderstandings. There was one area, where the alliance of both countries developed without any serious obstacles: military cooperation in a frame of bilateral Regional Forces Group. From the one hand, it was the stable fundament of difficult and ambiguous Russian-Belarusian „friendship”, and from the other hand for Kremlin, it was the most important tool of pressure on Minsk, which was a guarantee of loyalty of Lukashenka towards bigger ally. Belarusian president perfectly felt this „red line” and never questioned this sector of cooperation. Simultaneously he developed political game with the West, which allowed him to strengthen his position towards Kremlin. This tactics of „balancing” between East and West was the most effective during several periods of dialogue with Brussels and Washington but always was limited by inability of Belarusian regime to the real democratization.       

Consequently, Minsk felt growing threat of Russian pressure. On the other hand, Moscow became more and more irritated about lack of any success on integration, which could be used for propaganda’s purposes. Kremlin was determined to show its effectiveness at reconstruction of USSRR – at least at small scale –and such aspiration was growing together with aggressiveness in Russian regional policy, especially in context of dramatical developments in 2014, when happened annexation of Crimea to Russian Federation and in Ukrainian Donbas appeared two pro-Russian self-declared Donetskand Luhansk People's Republics. Furthermore, in context of dramatical course of Russian-Ukrainian conflict, especially huge war damage in eastern Ukraine and intervention of Russian troops in integrity of Ukraine as a one of neighbor states, Kremlin needed a positive example of its constructive role in building „new order” in post-soviet space. That’s why, after many years of stagnation, in 2018 Russia decided to launch a new diplomatic offensive towards Belarus, which was aimed at deeper integration of both countries, in accordance to agreement on Union State, signed on the 8th of December 1999. In summer 2018 Moscow appointed new ambassador to Minsk, Michail Babich, who did not have any diplomatic experience but as a trusted associate of Putin came to Belarus with special tusk to add integration to the priorities in bilateral agenda. In December 2018, during meeting of prime ministers of both states in Brest, the head of Russian government Dmitry Medvedev presented two paths of development Russian-Belarusian relations. First one assumed preservation of status quo what means functioning of Union State as theoretical or even virtual structure, what in Moscow’s opinion would mean gradual reduction of energy and economic subsidies for Belarus. Second one, more ambitious option, was an acceleration of integrational process, what would be connected with extension of preferences for Belarusian ally. This, almost open blackmail based on connection between conditioning political concessions with financial benefits, was immediately described by media as an „ultimatum of Medvedev”.        

Alyaksandr Lukashenko again faced difficult choice: to accept demands of Moscow and give up at least part of the sovereignty or to block integration, paying for that by reduction of subsidies, critically important for further functioning of not profitable Belarusian state owned industry. Belarusian president, as always choose third way – playing for time. Verbally he backed “ideologically correct” strategy of approaching of both countries and at the same time he was doing his best to postpone real decisions on key issue, concerning for instance common taxes, monetary policy and visa regulations. Consequently, negotiations, launched in the first quarter 2019 in a frame of Russian-Belarussian working groups, responsible for preparing 31 road maps on deeper integration got stuck without any visible results. Therefore planned for 8 December 2019 official celebration of the 20th anniversary of bilateral treaty on the creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus failed. Invited on this occasion to Sochi Alyaksnadr Łukashenka broke down the talks with Putin and returned to Minsk earlier then was marked in the schedule of his visit. On the rebound for this painful in terms of prestige disgrace, Moscow since the 1st of January 2020 cat supplies of crude oil for Belarus by even 80% in the first quarter. It was a serious hit in one of the most important sectors of Belarusian industry, which generated yearly about 10% GDP, 25% of export and about 20% of budget incomes. Nevertheless determination of Lukashenko to defend for any price his personal and country’s independence, even in this case allowed him further blocking of progress of highly risky integration.  

Additionally, as another factor in the difficult game between Minsk and Moscow in spring 2020 came internal tension in Belarusian society, connected to pandemic of Covid-19 and electoral campaign before presidential elections, planned for 9 August 2020. Growing dissatisfaction of many citizens, disappointed with lack of decent health care in terms of spreading coronavirus and frustrated with decline of living standards, forced the regime to react. Because of lack of enough financial resources in budget for “buying” loyalty of voters, Belarusian authorities found “external enemy” responsible for all troubles of Belarusians. In this way Russia became main danger, and Kremlin was accused in narration of state propaganda of attempts to destabilize the country and as a final goal to overthrow Lukashenka by giving financial support for his rivals in the elections. Moreover, regime claimed that Russian energy concern Gazprom was involved in to campaign of Wiktor Babaryko, the most popular opponent of the regime, who finally had been arrested in June, before official start of campaign. Afterwards, at the beginning of August just before the elections, Belarussian secret services detained group of professional military mercenaries from Russian private military company “Wagner Group”, who supposedly were preparing “anti-state” actions on Belarusian territory. Therefore negative picture of Kremlin was even strengthened and at the same time Russian Federation still keeps leading position of main market for Belarusian export, main supplier of energy resources and what could be the most paradoxical – still without any disturbances functioned military alliance, focused on common defense against “hostile” West.              

This convoluted dialectics of relations between Minsk and Moscow has been changed dramatically with developments in Belarus, just after the end of voting in presidential elections at 9 August. Rebellious citizens took the streets in order to demonstrate against forged results of elections, against next created “victory” of Lukashenko, who again officially has got 80% of votes. Surprised by unprecedented scale of protests, Lukashenko ordered to use brutal force against demonstrating people, has ended up dialogue with the West and simultaneously asked Russia to send military forces to Belarus. Although Russians did not entered Belarus, Kremlin again became “the best ally” of Belarusian authoritarian regime. All accusations, addressed before 9 August to Moscow, were immediately redirected to the West. From the one hand political crisis in Belarus in 2020 again revealed inability of Belarusian regime to play longer, more advanced game with the West, which acts according to completely different values and legal culture. From the other hand unprecedented international isolation of Belarus because of brutal crackdown of rebellious citizens, has not caused unconditional subordination towards Moscow.            

Mentioned above, very compound and full of contradictions Belarussian-Russian relations led again to situation when both sides “entrenched” on their positions, trying to get maximum benefits for the smallest price. Kremlin of course realized in August 2020 that Lukashenko’s regime is extremely weak and without Russian support will not be able to oppose wave of massive protests. In this regard theoretically, Moscow at that time could demand whatever it wanted, including replace Lukashenko by more loyal figure. However, Russian strategists had to measure and balance all pros and cons of any kind of interference into Belarusian crisis, to avoid collapse of regime, which was the most reliable guarantee of status quo. In Russian interest was support for Lukashenko than the end of dictatorship under pressure of street’s riot, especially in context of social unrest in Russia, caused by arrest of Alexei Navalny. That’s why Russia in August supported politically Lukashenko and afterwards in September decided to give financial assistance – loan on 1,5 billion of dollars. It also should be noted, that scale of this support was limited, in order to leave space for further pressure on issue of integration in Union State. Apart from that, Russia added new demand – expressed in quite delicate manner - which was so called “constitutional reform”, seen in Kremlin as an opportunity to get more possibilities for new political parties in Belarus, including structures supported (and finances) from Russian sources. However, so far Alyaksandr Lukashenko seems to be not interested in real amendments to Belarusian Constitution. Another sign of lack of willingness to concessions towards Moscow is a negative decision of Belarusian ministry of justice for application for registration submitted by pro-Russian party “Union”. Also it's worth mentioning that two last meetings of presidents of both countries, organized in February and in April have ended with no result (at least in public sphere). It means that both sides are still not able to breakthrough stalemate in bilateral relations.          

Apparently, current situation is more comfortable for Lukashenko. Russian Authorities do not hurry up with stronger pressure on Minsk, having in mind high risk of another crisis in relationships with Belarus. Escalation of tension would be highly inconvenient for Russia, especially in context of planned for September parliamentary elections as well as organized at that time together with Belarusian army common military exercises “Zapad” (the West). Kremlin would like to demonstrate successful, well-functioning alliance of both states and pleased, not irritated Lukashenko will be in this regard a key factor. However, it cannot be ruled out, that at the end of this year Russia could open new offensive against Minsk, using all available political, economic and energy tools. Isolated in international environment, Lukashenka has not wide space for maneuver but it is hard to expect that he will easily give up. Therefore, another conflict between “the best friends” is only a matter of time.