Three sources and three pillars of Ukraine's efforts in diplomatic resistance to Russian aggression

16.11.2020

The Russian-Ukrainian war, caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the occupation of Crimea and parts of Donbas, attempted annexation of the ARC and the city of Sevastopol, continues for the seventh year. All these years, the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the front line, and Ukrainian diplomacy on international diplomatic platforms have been heroically, highly professionally and successfully resisting the superior forces of the enemy, which poses the second largest nuclear military arsenal and is the second conventional force in the world.

Ukrainian diplomacy continues to make significant efforts on this front, first of all, on the international platforms of the UN system in New York and the OSCE in Vienna. Some efforts have also been made in the format of the signatories to the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum 1994 - BM), in particular calls for consultations in accordance with the possibilities provided in the document for conducting such consultations in case of threat to the security and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

According to the author of this article, in the current geopolitical conditions in the world and in the European region in the light of the ongoing Russian aggression, the fundamental, comprehensive response of Ukraine and the world democratic community to the Russian aggressor should be decisive, joint, comprehensive and complex involvement of the following three sources and components(pillars) of efforts to ensure the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Ukraine:

- Proper full implementation of the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum, according to which the five nuclear states - permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) guaranteed Ukraine security, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of the latter's refusal by its nuclear arsenal capacity. In 2014-2015, the author of this article, based on the analysis of fundamental documents of international law, Russian and Ukrainian national legislation, conducted a study of the legal status of this most important for guaranteeing security and territorial integrity of Ukraine and the world system of non-proliferation of international legal security document. to make an unequivocal conclusion that the BM is a full-fledged, multilateral treaty of international law, binding on all its parties, especially Russia - the main, principled, defiant violator of the provisions of this document, as well as other signatories (Ukraine has fulfilled its obligations in full), who evaded their fundamental obligations under the document, did not provide Ukraine with adequate assistance to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia's aggression alone.

- UN peacekeeping capabilities and experience in conducting successful large-scale international integrated peacekeeping operations involving three integral components: an international military peacekeeping contingent that guarantees a ceasefire and full separation of the parties, and in case of unwillingness of the parties - forces them to peace; a transitional international civil administration, which temporarily performs the functions of a local "government" until the transfer of power to democratically elected local national administrative structures in accordance with the legislation of the host country; international transitional police and justice, consisting of qualified international specialists and experts, whose responsibilities include the formation of a local law enforcement and judicial system in accordance with international law and the law of the host country. Personal professional experience of the author of this article in 1998-1999 during the work as a part of such complex peacekeeping operations in the Balkans (Croatia and Bosnia), as well as the subsequent recent history of this region testify to the high efficiency and success of such international operations.

- The third important component of ensuring the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in its counteraction to Russian aggression is the continued active involvement of the world's largest and most extensive regional security organization - the OSCE,its fundamental norms and principles, fundamental legal and regulatory documents and autonomous institutions. Ukraine needs to continue to make maximum use of OSCE tools to politically and diplomatically ensure effective protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to prevent this issue from being replaced by attempts by individual countries to establish a dialogue with Russia on a business as usual basis, while leaving unpunished its actions security.

Analysis of Ukraine's current efforts to counter Russian aggression on a wide range of diplomatic platforms and tracks allows us to make concrete proposals to optimize and coordinate the necessary actions of Ukraine to ensure security and sovereignty, restore territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

In the current geopolitical conditions prevailing in the world and in the European region, Ukrainian diplomacy needs to focus on the complex threefold task of joint implementation of the three above-mentioned components of its priority political and security efforts.

Perhaps the most prompt and effective reaction of the world community to the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine was the launch of a special field presence of the OSCE in Ukraine. As early as March 2014, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) was established to promote peace, stability and security, and to monitor and support the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments.

The negotiation process within the framework of the TCG in Minsk, Normandy format, mainly consists in the implementation of the Minsk agreements, which continue to demonstrate their ineffectiveness. These Agreements formally expired at the end of 2015 and have since been extended for one year several times. However, their starting positions have long been inconsistent with the real situation at the front, as the actual line of demarcation between the parties to the conflict since the adoption of the Agreements in 2014-2015 has changed significantly, the Russian occupation forces in their violation captured another 3 thousand sq.km. Ukrainian territory. However, the Minsk agreements, despite the fact that they were concluded in Ukraine in unfavorable, "stressful" external conditions, still carry some positive potential and will have the right to coexist with other negotiating formats for some time to come. In addition, erroneous (according to the author of this article) misconceptions that Western anti-Russian sanctions are "tied" to the Minsk agreements are quite common in the international expert community and politicum.

During the six years of operation of the Normandy (Germany, France, Ukraine, Russia) and Minsk (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE) negotiation formats, it is obvious that the initiative to negotiate, make proposals for discussion in their course and form documents prepared for negotiations and as a result of their holding, previously mainly belonged to the Russian side. This situation was explained by various reasons, in particular, the predominant human, expert and material resources, which were involved by the Russian side to ensure these negotiations, as well as the established imperial traditions of Russia's activities in the foreign policy arena. However, in June 2020, almost for the first time in recent years, the Ukrainian delegation in Minsk seized the initiative to negotiate. This initiative, in particular, consisted in reforming Ukraine's participation in the TCG, raising the level of Ukrainian negotiators by including members of the Verkhovna Rada and individual Deputy Ministers in the Ukrainian delegation. In addition, several internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in Kyiv after the temporary occupation of Donbass were included in the Ukrainian delegation as representatives of Donbass. Such a rather spectacular and unexpected move by the Ukrainian side actually knocked the ground out from the Russian side, which affected their traditional self-confidence in their actions and caused them obvious irritation.

Continuing to pay attention to the negotiations in the Minsk and Normandy formats, the Ukrainian side should not overestimate the effectiveness and efficiency of these negotiations, given the unwillingness of the Russian side to implement these agreements honestly and in full, as well as the contradictory status of the Minsk agreements and international law. military and political conditions under which they were concluded. First, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as parties to this document, continue to interpret their main provisions differently. At the same time, the Russian side, in general, refuses to recognize itself as a party to the Agreements, as well as a party to the conflict itself, considering itself only as a mediator, along with the OSCE. Moscow also believes that the Minsk agreements became legally binding only after the adoption of the relevant UN Security Council Resolution, which approved the relevant Minsk package of measures adopted by the parties in February 2015. At the same time, Russia constantly insisted on Ukraine's compliance with all with the exception of the provisions of the Minsk agreements, it avoids the obligation to implement them. By the same logic, the Russian Federation refrains from recognizing the legal status of an international treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1980, as it insists on denying its status as a party to the Treaties, while only subjects of international law can be parties to treaties (states or international organizations). All this Russian legal equilibrium is intended only to prove that the Minsk agreements are legally binding only for Ukraine, but not for Russia.

Ukraine needs to continue working to expand the negotiation formats, first of all to involve the Budapest guarantors of its security and territorial integrity (USA, Great Britain, and possibly China) and to revive the Geneva negotiation platform (USA-EU-Ukraine-Russia), which would ensure involvement in the negotiations of the world's most powerful players (nuclear states, permanent members of the UN Security Council), which 25 years ago provided Ukraine with written international legal guarantees of its security and territorial integrity in accordance with the BM, which were not observed in the face of Russian aggression.

At the same time, the Memorandum is a valid, full-fledged international treaty, binding on its signatories ("guarantors" of the independence and inviolability of Ukraine's borders). First of all, this applies to the Russian Federation - the main violator of the Budapest "guarantees". The 6-party memorandum at the highest level reaffirmed to Ukraine the guarantees set out in the 1975 OSCE Helsinki Final Act: respect for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and existing borders; refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine and that no weapons will ever be used against it except in cases of self-defense, refrain from economic coercion.

The failure of the Budapest "guarantees" is a signal to the world that perhaps the only reliable way to ensure the security of states is to develop their own nuclear weapons. More than a dozen countries that had the intentions and technological capabilities to create such weapons have pondered over this dilemma, asking themselves an almost Shakespearean question - "to have or not to have?" Nuclear states, permanent members of the UN Security Council. The logic of the leadership of countries such as Iran and the DPRK may be that if the "guarantees" of nuclear powers do not work for Ukraine, a European democracy, a good member of the world community, they are unlikely to work for countries in Western rhetoric, called the countries of the "axis of evil", "outcasts", countries "pariahs".

However, the erosion of the non-proliferation regime is only one element of the "Pandora's box" that broke Putin's regime. The entire international security architecture formed as a result of the Second World War is under threat. Russia's occupation and attempts to annex the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol mark the first time in postwar history that one country has illegally seized another country's territory in central Europe. For the last time in recent history, such crimes were committed by the Nazis. If Russia goes unpunished for setting a precedent for military aggression and occupation of foreign territories in the 21st century, the further consequences for European security as a whole can be extremely sad, as there are many other historical examples of acute border conflicts on the continent.